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We document entry and capacity expansion in US long-distance ﬁber-optic networks before and
during the “telecom boom.” We disentangle the many swaps and leases between networks in order
to measure owned route miles versus route miles shared with other carriers. Entry appears much
more moderate when these shared miles are not counted. Strategic behavior can lead to excessive
entry, and we ﬁnd evidence of such behavior regarding total miles (including swaps and leases) but
not regarding owned miles. We conclude that entry was excessive only with regard to swaps and
leases, but not with regard to the physical building of the networks.
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During the late 1990s there was tremendous capacity expansion and entry of new ﬁrms in the North
American long-haul telecommunications industry. These expansions were driven by very fast de-
mand growth for Internet and other data-oriented telecom services and by exponential decreases
in the cost per bit transmitted using ﬁber optic communications equipment. But by 2001, com-
petition and slowing demand growth were squeezing the proﬁts of these carriers, and an equally
unprecedented slowdown in spending occurred. The problems in the telecommunications sector
have been blamed for dragging down growth in the entire U.S. economy.
As the expansion turned to bust, discussion of “excessive entry” and a “ﬁber glut” became increas-
ingly common. Generally the ﬁber glut story revolves around three premises. First, Internet growth
was not as fast as expected, and in particular, not as fast as Worldcom claimed (Odlyzko 2003).
Second, the still-high growth rate of data traﬃc was “...not nearly fast enough to use all of the
millions of miles of ﬁber-optic lines that were buried beneath streets and oceans in the late-1990s
frenzy.”1 Third, the equipment used to send data over ﬁber optic cable improved dramatically so
that each strand of ﬁber could carry many more gigabits of data: “Perhaps never before has the
eﬃciency of an industry’s technology gotten so far ahead of demand.”2
These gloomy statements have become the conventional wisdom: there was excessive entry of ﬁber
optic networks based on overoptimism and strategic behavior. In this paper, we analyze whether this
conventional wisdom is correct based on new data we have collected. Our data distinguish between
sunk investments (actual miles of right-of-way) and non-sunk investments (relatively fungible swaps
and leases of conduit space and ﬁber). We also run empirical tests for strategic behavior that might
lead to ex post unproﬁtable networks. We ﬁnd that more than half of the entry was non-sunk
investment, and evidence for strategic behavior is largely limited to these non-sunk investments.
We conclude that the “excessive” label is applicable only to these swaps and leases.
Before moving further, let us clarify the industry segment we are discussing. The national ﬁber-
1Yochi Dreazen, “Behind the Fiber Glut – Telecom Carriers Were Driven By Wildly Optimistic Data on Internet’s
Growth Rate,” The Wall Street Journal, September 26, 2002, pg. B1.
2Dennis Berman, “Behind the Fiber Glut – Innovation Outpaced the Marketplace,” The Wall Street Journal,
September 26, 2002, pg. B1.
2optic networks connect major cities using cable laid along railroad, gas pipeline, and other rights of
way. This industry segment is not regulated by the FCC or other government agencies, except to
the extent that there may be environmental and safety restrictions regarding rights of way. National
networks sell high capacity links between speciﬁc cities and nationwide coverage to all cities. Their
customers are primarily long-distance telephone companies, Internet backbone providers, and large
corporations. Many of the companies are vertically integrated into some of these downstream
segments. The most famous example is AT&T which also oﬀers long distance telephone service;
other ﬁrms like Level 3 oﬀer their own Internet backbones.3 For this paper, we are focusing on the
most basic level only – the physical infrastructure that allows these networks to operate. These
ﬁrms have additional interest because many of them were involved in scandals, including Worldcom,
Global Crossing, Qwest, and Enron.
There are several complementary types of infrastructure that we do not study here. These include
regional and metropolitan ﬁber-optic networks and local access networks such as telephone and
cable television. Most of the traﬃc on the national networks has to traverse these other networks
as well, but they operate in distinct markets. It is not practical to provide national service by
combinations of regional networks, nor is it practical to provide more than very limited regional
service on a portion of a national network. While all types of networks experienced major investment
in the late 1990s, it was the national ﬁber-optic networks that appeared to be the most “overbuilt”
and were most implicated in the collapse.
To our knowledge there is no economics literature analyzing the national networks’ growth and
decline. Indeed, very little data has been collected on which ﬁrms entered when and where. Until
1998, Jonathan Kraushaar of the Federal Communications Commission published a yearly update
on long distance ﬁber optic networks, but this was discontinued just as industry investment took
oﬀ. In this paper we present newly collected data that merges Kraushaar’s work with publicly
available information on ﬁrms’ entry decisions up to the end of 2001.
Section 2 discusses the relevant theory of ﬁrm entry, investment, and sunk costs and applies it to
the national ﬁber-optic network industry. We also compare today’s telecoms crisis to the problems
of late nineteenth century railroads. In section 3, we describe our data sources and methods of data
3Economides (2004) analyzes the Internet backbones and describes how the competition in national ﬁber networks
has made entry quite easy in the backbone market.
3collection. We analyze the pattern of entry and the decrease in industry concentration in section
4. In section 5, we test for strategic behavior. Section 6 concludes.
2 Sunk Costs and National Fiber-Optic Networks
The building of the national ﬁber optic networks is another chapter in the peculiar history of U.S.
infrastructure industries. This history started with the canal boom of the early nineteenth century,
reached its most dramatic episode in the railroad booms and busts of the late nineteenth century,
and has continued since then with electricity transmission, trucking and Interstate highways, and
cable television among others. All of these industries have been politically as well as economi-
cally important, and all have been characterized by ﬁnancial instability and/or heavy government
regulation.
In particular, the recent telecom boom and bust has been compared to the nineteenth century
railroad experience, and the two do appear similar in many regards. In both cases, a large number
of ﬁrms gained access to rights-of-way between major cities, built multiple parallel routes, and then
engaged in intense competition that left many of them bankrupt. But we discuss below that the
key to this comparison is the nature of sunk costs in the two industries, and that in fact the two
are quite diﬀerent in this regard.
Entry decisions in high-sunk-cost industries can be represented using a two-stage game (Sutton
1998). In stage 1, ﬁrms make irreversible investments that determine their characteristics, such as
product variety or quality or some measure of capacity. These investments are industry-speciﬁc
sunk costs, so the ﬁrms do not exit the market later in the game. In stage 2, the ﬁrms compete
according to Cournot, diﬀerentiated Bertrand, or some other type of competition. The terms of this
competition are aﬀected by the stage 1 decisions. Sutton suggests that a very loose requirement for
a solution to this game is a criterion of viability. That is, ﬁrms will not make stage 1 investments
that they cannot recoup as operating proﬁt in stage 2.
Faulhaber and Hogendorn (2000) argue that for infrastructure industries like telecom networks,
the basic game structure can be further reﬁned as follows: In stage 1, ﬁrms invest in distribution
capacity that determines where they can oﬀer service in geographical space. Then stage 2 can be
4divided into two parts. In stage 2a, ﬁrms invest in production capacity that determines how much
they can produce in each area that they serve, and in stage 2b they compete in each area subject to
these production capacity constraints. The key to this interpretation is that distribution capacity
is a sunk cost because investments like rights-of-way, conduits, and utility poles have no alternative
use and are not fungible. But production capacity is not sunk because investments like locomotives,
telephone switches, and transformers can be resold or redeployed and are therefore fungible.
Under this interpretation, the key to competition between infrastructure ﬁrms is geography, since
the sunk distribution capacity means that once a ﬁrm enters a territory it can commit not to leave.
Production capacity, on the other hand, may aﬀect short-run competitive outcomes (for example,
it might lead to Cournot outcomes in the manner of Kreps and Scheinkman (1983)), but it does
not carry long-run commitment value. For example, entry by a second railroad between two cities
would irrevocably increase the number of competitors to two, but it would not inevitably lead to
zero-proﬁt Bertrand competition since production capacity (e.g. the number of locomotives) could
be adjusted periodically.
For long-haul ﬁber optic networks, distribution capacity involves securing a right of way, burying
protective conduits in this right-of-way, building “huts” to house equipment at intervals along the
route, and placing ﬁber-optic cable inside the conduit.4 Each strand of ﬁber has very large data
capacity, each cable contains many strands of ﬁber, and many ﬁrms own multiple conduits, so for
the foreseeable future no further upgrades to this distribution capacity are necessary.5
It is prohibitively expensive to acquire new rights-of-way, so the networks generally follow highways,
railroads, and natural gas pipelines. In fact, several of the major networks are associated with
companies that own these rights-of-way. Williams, for example, is a natural gas pipeline owner,
while Qwest was originally a division of the Southern Paciﬁc Railroad. There is some irony in the
comparison with nineteenth century railroads because in many cases the same rights of way were
used during the ﬁber boom.6
Production capacity consists of terminal equipment that takes electronic data from many sources,
4Planning of these networks is described and modeled in Lanning et al. (2000).
5There are periodically advances in the quality of ﬁber-optic strands, so systems in which it is easier to install
new ﬁber have an advantage in the long run.
6The geographic distribution of Internet infrastructure is discussed in Greenstein (forthcoming).
5switches and combines it into channels, and converts it to optical signals using lasers. This is called
“lighting” the ﬁber in the industry jargon. Such equipment is expensive but can be moved, resold,
expanded, and contracted given suﬃcient lead time. There are some sunk costs involved, so the
quantity of lit ﬁber has some short-run commitment value. But in the long run, overcapacity and
low prices on a particular route should lead to redeployment of equipment away from that route
– though it may take some time since an aggregate shock to the industry reduces the resale value
of all such equipment. For now the marginal cost of production capacity relative to the size of
demand is very small and appears to be causing very low prices.
Why did numerous ﬁrms invest in distribution capacity when there were signs that operating proﬁts
would be low? Part of the answer is that the number of ﬁrms that installed production capacity
is much larger than the number that installed distribution capacity. The reason this was possible
is that owners of rights-of-way were willing to sell indefeasible rights of use (IRUs) by means of
which ﬁrms could obtain either space in conduits or dark ﬁber (ﬁber optic cable with no terminal
equipment attached at the ends). Since most networks contain several conduits and many ﬁbers,
it is possible to sell IRUs to the same route several times. For example, the predecessors of both
Global Crossing and Genuity obtained IRUs to most of the route miles in Qwest’s network in 1997
and 1998.
IRUs convey many of the rights of ownership, but they are typically limited to 20 years, can be
dissolved by mutual agreement, and are frequently abrogated by bankruptcy courts. Furthermore,
despite the careful language of IRU agreements, in an industry with rapidly changing technology
there are likely to be many noncontractables that could render an IRU economically obsolete earlier
than its legal expiration.
The fact that so many ﬁber-optic networks are based on IRUs means that sunk distribution capacity
is much less than the number of national networks would suggest. Firms that go bankrupt and
hold IRUs are likely to exit the industry once and for all. Only those ﬁrms that actually hold right
of way are committed to continuing employment of their assets even in the face of bankruptcy
reorganization.
Contrast this situation to the nineteenth century railroad boom. Arthur Hadley (1885) discussed
how the sunk-cost nature of railroad right of way created perpetual instability in the railroad
6industry. When competition on a route (New York to Chicago was particularly competitive) was too
great to support all the lines on the route, some railroads went bankrupt. But their sunk investment
in right of way had no alternative use, so the insolvent line simply emerged from bankruptcy with its
debt reduced, and the number of competitors remained the same. This pattern, and the companies’
collusive attempts to combat it, eventually led to regulation of the industry.7
3 Data
The simplest summary measure of distribution capacity is total route-miles of network.8 All net-
works in the sample reach all major American cities, so a network with more route miles serves
more small cities and/or has more redundant routes between major cities. The number of route
miles thus provides a measure of the eﬀective number of ﬁrms competing to provide national ser-
vice. For example, two 15,000 route mile networks would indicate a symmetric duopoly on service
between major cities. In contrast, one 10,000 mile network and one 30,000 mile network would
indicate duopoly between major cities but monopoly on subsidiary routes; in this case the overall
market would be on average somewhat less competitive. (Clearly the second market would provide
more producer plus consumer surplus since it serves more city-pairs, but our interest here is simply
that industry proﬁts would be higher in the second case under any plausible oligopolistic form of
competition.)
Our data use network route miles to measure the eﬀective number of ﬁrms and the quantity of
sunk investments. We diﬀerentiate between owned miles which reﬂect actual sunk investments in
right of way and structures versus shared miles which merely reﬂect investment in IRUs and similar
agreements. The sum of these, total miles, gives a measure of short-run industry concentration,
while owned miles alone gives an upper limit on concentration if all IRUs were dissolved.
In nearly all cases, the promotional and technical materials made available by telecom ﬁrms do not
7Railroads had, and in large part continue to have, diﬃculty in sharing trackage because there are extensive
economies of scope between train operation and track maintenance (Pittman 2005); these are not present in ﬁber
optic networks.
8Each route mile typically contains many strands of ﬁber-optic cable, so measures of “ﬁber miles” or “strand
miles” are usually many times larger than route miles.
7diﬀerentiate between the two types of route miles. Thus we reconstructed the process by which
each network was built, noting which routes are based on IRUs and which on owned right of way.
In some cases, routes are jointly owned, in which case we count one-half the miles for each of two
owners and one-third for each of three. Jointly owned routes are a much smaller portion of total
mileage than are IRUs and do not greatly aﬀect the totals.
During the period 1986-1998, the FCC collected similar data from the inter-exchange (long distance)
telephone companies. These data were compiled and analyzed by Jonathan Kraushaar in what was
then the Commission’s Common Carrier Bureau, and the reports continue to be available at the
FCC’s website. The FCC data collection proceeded through voluntary questionnaires and telephone
calls, and they received a high response rate. Toward the end of the sample period, they expressed
concern that ﬁber routes miles were being double-counted, precisely for the reasons we discussed
above. We use the FCC data for nearly all ﬁrms that had ﬁber networks during the period 1990-96,
with some corrections for shared mileage. For 1997-98, we use the FCC data primarily as a check
against our own data. From 1999-2001 we must rely on our own data exclusively. We found that
in most cases our data was consistent with the FCC’s.
Our main source for total route miles is the ﬁrms’ annual reports and investment prospectuses
as ﬁled with the Securities and Exchange Commission and available through the online EDGAR
database (primarily forms 10-K and S-4). Some companies included very meticulous network data
with these ﬁlings, while others simply mentioned route miles in passing.
To supplement that source, we also searched each company’s press releases using the archives on
LEXIS/NEXIS. In many cases, ﬁrms obtained routes by swapping IRUs to their own right of way
for IRUs to the right of way of their competitors. The ﬁrms often announced and promoted these
swaps as an inexpensive way to build their network quickly. In several cases, ﬁrms swapped access
to a preexisting IRU for a preexisting IRU on another ﬁrm’s route, so that the swaps could be
more than one layer deep. Because of this, we frequently know that a route is based on an IRU
but cannot deﬁnitely determine the source of that IRU. Fortunately, this problem does not aﬀect
the computation of owned versus shared route miles.
The ﬁrms’ reports were checked on a route-by-route basis against network maps available at the
companies’ web sites (in most cases) or from Internet service provider resellers (for Qwest, MCI-
8Worldcom, McLeodUSA, and ENRON). They were also checked against the map “North American
National and Regional Fiberoptic Long-Haul Routes Planned and In Place” published by KMI
Research and dated May 2002. The inconsistencies were minor.
Although we are quite conﬁdent that the routes identiﬁed as shared are in fact shared, there are
probably additional IRUs and swaps that were not reported. As such, the database is conservative
since it attributes all other miles as owned. We were not able to ﬁnd as complete data on Sprint as
on other networks. All our sources suggest that Sprint’s network was largely completed before the
sample period and not signiﬁcantly expanded thereafter. For years in which no data was available
for Sprint, we have assumed no expansion and entered the previous year’s ﬁgure.
The sample is limited to ﬁrms that either achieved national reach or had announced aspirations to
national reach. Regional networks (which include the local telephone companies) are not counted.
They actually include the majority of ﬁber in the United States, but they do not compete in
the same national market. Providing national coverage by piecing together circuits from regional
networks is too expensive and unreliable to be competitive.9 We also exclude ﬁrms that purchased
access to national networks but did not own any mileage of their own and did not participate in
any swaps of IRUs; these were customers, not peers, of the carriers listed.
4 Entry and Investment
We now document the pattern of entry and show that a large proportion of investment is shared
miles. When only owned miles are considered, entry appears more moderate and industry concen-
tration more typical of a high-sunk-cost industry.
Table 1 shows total network route miles (owned plus shared) by ﬁrm for the period 1990-2001. We
9The excluded regional networks are the Regional Bell Operating Companies (RBOCs) and Alltel, Black Hills
Fibercom, C3 Networks, Columbia Transcom, Connectiv, Dominion Telecom, Dukenet, El Paso Global Networks,
Electric Lightwave, Entergy, Florida Fiber Network, FPL Fibernet, GPU Telecom, Iowa Network Services, ITC
Deltacom, Kentucky Data Link, Logix Communications, MP Telecom, NEON, Norlight, Onvoy, Palmetonet, Progress
Telecom, SON Communications, Telergy, Time Warner Telecom, and Valleynet. Several of the ﬁrms that are included
are essentially regional carriers that expanded to national reach through IRUs. These are DTI, EPIK, Metromedia,
Pathnet, and Touch America.
9include both “lit” and “dark” miles since the dark miles would still be expected to exert competitive
pressures in the long run. During the early 1990s, three large long distance companies, AT&T, MCI,
and Sprint, had been joined by Williams, a natural gas pipeline company that built a nationwide
ﬁber optic network. Williams sold this network to Worldcom in 1995.10
In 1997 – two years after the Netscape initial public oﬀering launched the Internet as a major
commercial force and one year after passage of the Telecommunications Act – growth in route
miles increased rapidly. This was a combination of expansion by existing networks and de novo
entry. By 2001, there were 19 national networks, but proﬁts were low and Pathnet had exited the
market, while EPIK contracted back to its Florida base. In 2002, almost all of these ﬁrms were in
bankruptcy.
EPIK’s sudden contraction from national to regional network demonstrates that the distribution
capacity of some of these companies did not consist of sunk assets. Tables 2 and 3 show route
miles actually owned by each ﬁrm in each of the years and the percentage of total route miles that
were owned. At the beginning of the 1990s, all networks were owned outright by the carriers. But
entry in the later 90s involved so many swaps and IRUs that many “national” carriers owned only
a small percent of their rights of way, and in a few cases owned none at all.
The bulk of total investment in network route miles came during 1998, 1999, and 2000. The
majority of the new miles in this period were shared. New right of way built in this period is
mostly accounted for by upgrades to the old AT&T and MCIWorldcom networks and the entry of
three new major networks, Qwest, Level 3, and Williams (see Figure 1). One way to interpret this
is that four incumbents were joined by three entrants and fringe ﬁrms that were partially dependent
on the seven major networks.
These data suggest that the industry did not experience overbuilding and ruinous competition along
the same lines as the railroads of the late 1800s. Rather, actual construction of new rights of way
represented modest entry, but the swaps of IRUs created a very competitive environment in which
prices fell.
10The FCC’s Worldcom data appears to include regional networks. We use only national route miles reported by
Worldcom (and its predecessor LDDS) in SEC ﬁlings.
10The Herﬁndahl-Hirschman Indices (HHIs) and the equivalent number of equal-sized ﬁrms (calcu-
lated from the inverse of the HHI) for each year based on total miles and owned miles appear in
Table 4. Not all of the networks use their capacity equally, but these measures based on route miles
do provide a guide to the potential long-run industry structure.
The diﬀerence between competition in terms of total miles and owned miles is striking. Using total
miles, the industry moved from an oligopolistic HHI to a very competitive one. But using owned
miles, the industry remained above the 1,000 limit for government scrutiny of mergers based on
the Department of Justice’s 1992 Horizontal Merger Guidelines. Still, there were eight equivalent
equal-sized ﬁrms using owned miles, which is a large number of competitors by the standards of
previous infrastructure developments such as railroads and early telephone.
We have now shown that shared miles made up a very substantial portion of entry into the industry.
Total miles grew so fast as to push concentration measures into an unsupportable region. But using
owned miles, entry was more measured and concentration remained in the oligopoly range. By these
measures, we conclude that while total miles may not have been viable, owned miles were probably
much closer to viability (if they had not been shared out). Why would ﬁrms invest in miles that
were not viable? One answer is that there was a race to capture a leading position in the industry,
and the investment was strategic. In the next section, we test this hypothesis.
5 Testing for Strategic Behavior
Instability and overcapacity in infrastructure industries are frequently attributed to strategic be-
havior connected with sunk costs. Many dynamic models of ﬁrm investment show that a ﬁrm
moving earlier should invest more than the static optimum in order to reduce the extent of in-
vestment by later entrants (e.g. Dixit (1980), Fudenberg and Tirole (1983)). We will call this
behavior building ahead to avoid the pejorative tone of speciﬁc examples of this behavior like entry
deterrence, preemption, or “top dog.” Typically building ahead only works if the initial investment
is sunk and therefore involves a long-term commitment, thus, it can work particularly well in in-
frastructure industries. If building ahead occurs, and there is an unanticipated shock that suddenly
stops investment, then the industry’s excess capacity will be particularly large.
11Our alternative hypothesis to building ahead is “symmetric investment.” Suppose a group of ﬁrms
(possibly including new entrants) is subject to a favorable demand or technology shock and invests
to take advantage of the opportunity. If each ﬁrm believes that its investment timing will have
a negligible inﬂuence on the other ﬁrms’ eventual cumulative investment, then there is no reason
to invest beyond the static optimum. As the opportunity grows, all such ﬁrms will invest at rates
that are not inﬂuenced by the prior investment of other ﬁrms. Under symmetric investment, an
unanticipated negative shock will still lead to excess capacity, but it will be less than under building
ahead and will not be attributable to market failure resulting from strategic excesses.
In this section we analyze the data to test whether networks were built ahead or experienced
symmetric investment. Our method is based on Gilbert and Lieberman (1987) (hereafter GL). GL
examine capacity data in the chemical industry to determine whether it is consistent with a model
of “preemption” (building ahead) or “maintaing market share” (symmetric investment).
GL collect data on 24 chemical products produced by 3 to 20 ﬁrms, circa 1960 through 1982. The
dependent variable is binary: yi,j,t = 1 if ﬁrm i increased its capacity to produce product j in year
t by more than 5%. The 5% threshold is arbitrary, but they claim that using other thresholds does
not aﬀect the results. The reason to use a binary variable is to avoid scaling problems since small
ﬁrms have huge percent changes in their early years. All observations begin two years after the
ﬁrm enters the industry, so the startup capacity investment is excluded.
GL’s independent variables are constructed from ﬁrm i’s production capacity and the total industry
output. They are: capacity utilization (averaged over two years), growth rate of output (averaged
over four years), the ﬁrm’s share of total capacity, the change in the ﬁrm’s capacity share (over
a two year period), and a “bandwagon eﬀect” that measures the percent increase in all rivals’
capacity. Because they expect that large and small ﬁrms may behave diﬀerently, they interact all
the variables with the ﬁrm’s capacity share.
They argue that the coeﬃcients on these variables provide a test for strategic investment. If ﬁrms
build ahead, then investment will not be aﬀected by capacity share since other considerations will
drive ﬁrm behavior. Instead it will respond negatively to bandwagon investment (since that implies
that rivals have already built ahead) and positively to capacity utilization (since building ahead
implies an eﬀort to keep capacity high relative to revenue).
12Suppose that instead of building ahead, there is a symmetric capacity expansion. The probability of
a ﬁrm investing aggressively may not be aﬀected by capacity utilization, but it responds negatively
to changes in capacity share since ﬁrms will roughly maintain their market shares. Investment
should respond positively to bandwagon investment by others since ﬁrms have to keep up with one
another in order to maintain their positions in the industry.
GL’s estimates show small chemical ﬁrms, below 9% market share, build ahead while large ﬁrms
seem to maintain market share. To bolster this result, they estimate a restricted model with only
the variables expected to aﬀect building ahead. The reduced model is rejected on the basis of a
likelihood ratio test in favor of the full model. Its estimates again suggest that large ﬁrms can be
deterred.
We apply this model to our data on the ﬁber optic industry. The company reports frequently give
plans to put new route miles in service within one year, so we convert all lags to one year. We face
three main diﬃculties in translating GL’s model, namely what constitutes capacity, output, and
capacity utilization.
For a measure of capacity we use route miles. As we have argued above, all of the networks are
similar in terms of coverage of the entire country, so additional route miles imply a more dense,
more robust network. The actual production capacity of each link in the network is not important
because the advances in ﬁber optic technology essentially eliminated data throughput constraints.
Thus mileage, and the associated density of the network, is the key capacity decision. We label
ﬁrm i’s total and owned miles in year t by MT
i,t and MO
i,t respectively.
We cannot directly observe the output of these communications networks; such data are diﬃcult to
measure even for the owners of the networks themselves and are not publicly available. Instead we
proxy for industry output with industry revenue. Revenues of the long distance networks themselves
are the seemingly logical focus of interest, but there are two problems with using them. First, many
of the ﬁrms, such as AT&T, derive most of their revenue from lines of business not directly related
to their long-haul networks. The ﬁrms do not report suﬃciently disaggregated revenue to correct for
this problem. Second, the networks’ revenue is determined endogenously with investment in route
miles, so proper estimation would require good instruments. As an alternative, we use total revenue
of the U.S. telecoms industry. Since these data include various local telephone, wireless telephone,
13and business services, they should remove much of the endogeneity problem and provide an index
for opportunities to build additional route miles. The source for these data is the International
Telecommunications Union Yearbook of Statistics, 2003 and 2000 editions. Yearly revenue (REVt)
and growth in revenue (GROWt = (REVt/REVt−1) − 1) are reported in Table 5.11 Revenue is
measured in 1995 dollars using the consumer price index.
Finally, we need a measure of capacity utilization. The same problems with output data occur
here too, so we compare growth in revenue to growth in capacity. We calculate a Revenue per Mile
Index for both total and owned miles, RMIT
t and RMIO
t , by comparing revenue per mile in year t















In 1990 there appear to have been modest opportunities to expand route miles since there was a
gradual increase in miles in the succeeding years. Relative to this base level, RMI > 1 indicates
relatively better opportunities while RMI < 1 indicates relatively poorer ones.
An interesting feature of these data is that in 1995-97, there were arguably opportunities to add
route mileage (based on revenue), particularly when looking at owned miles only. By the end of
the sample period, revenue per mile had fallen sharply. Owned miles show much less of this trend
than total miles due to the extensive use of shared mileage.
Given these interpretations of capacity, output, and capacity utilization, we can construct the rest






































11An alternative growth measure, Internet traﬃc growth, proved to be highly collinear.
14Note that the bandwagon variable is diﬀerent from DELSHARE because it concerns investment
in the current year and it does not account for a ﬁrm’s own investment. The correlation between
BAND and DELSHARE is R = 0.10 for total miles and R = 0.14 for owned miles.
Because small ﬁrms may diﬀer from large ﬁrms, all variables are interacted with SHARE. Since
investment decisions must be taken prior to their realizations, all variables are lagged one year
except for BAND.
The dependent variable is binary and measures whether route miles were increased substantially
in a given year. For some threshold change d, deﬁne
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and 0 otherwise. The reason to use the binary variable is that smaller ﬁrms have huge percentage
additions in some years, which introduces scaling problems. We want to choose d to represent ﬁrms
that made signiﬁcant investments over and above the general trend in the industry. We remove the
ﬁrst year for new entrants from the sample. Then we observe the median and 40th, 60th, and 70th
percentile growth in route miles across all observations (see Table 6). We run several regressions,
deﬁning the dependent variable using d equal to each of these percentile values.
The results of probit analysis using total miles are reported in Table 7, along with the predicted
signs under the two hypotheses. The diﬀerent cutoﬀ levels d seem to aﬀect signiﬁcance levels more
than magnitudes of the estimates. Changes in market share clearly do not aﬀect investment, which
is characteristic of building ahead. The bandwagon eﬀect is positive for small ﬁrms but negative
for larger ones (though only signiﬁcant for the median case). This may suggest that small ﬁrms
were building ahead and reducing investment by large ones. For the median case (d = 7.3%), the
boundary between “large” and “small” ﬁrms is 10.8% capacity share, roughly the size of the four
major incumbents.12
Following GL, we also ran regressions omitting the variables SHARE and DELSHARE since they
are not expected to aﬀect building ahead. The signs of the estimates do not change on the remaining
variables. Likelihood ratio tests accept the building ahead model for the 40th, 50th, and 60th
12GL warn that favorable shocks to investment payoﬀs could make the bandwagon eﬀect positive even under the
building ahead hypothesis. That may have occurred here, in which case our evidence does not rule out the small
ﬁrms building ahead of one another.
15percentile cases, and reject for the 70th percentile case.13 This suggests that building ahead, at
least by small ﬁrms, is a plausible explanation for investment in total miles.
Table 8 reports results using owned miles only. The sample is slightly smaller because in four cases
ﬁrms entered the market with zero owned miles in their ﬁrst year. In many respects, the results are
similar to total miles. Again the coeﬃcients on BAND suggest that smaller ﬁrms may have built
ahead of larger ones, with the boundary between ﬁrm sizes at about 13% capacity share. However,
the DELSHARE variables are now signiﬁcant also, which is not expected in GL.
The restricted model ﬁts more poorly for owned miles than for total miles. For all but the 70th
percentile case, it is rejected by likelihood ratio test.14 No doubt this is because of the greater
importance of the DELSHARE variables. Thus, the evidence for building ahead is much more
limited and more mixed than in the total miles case.
We believe that two conclusions can be gleaned from these results:
First, and most important, the carriers that were building owned miles and incurring sunk costs
do not appear to have been building ahead to reduce rivals’ investment. (Or if they tried this
strategy, it generally failed.) Strategic overbuilding is often mentioned as a weakness of unregulated
infrastructure industries, but the basic installation of the the ﬁber optic networks does not follow
this pattern.
Second, there is some evidence for strategic building ahead of total miles. Again this points to IRUs
as being a destabilizing factor in the industry since they appear to have been used to deter other
investments. In particular, several smaller ﬁrms entered the market using IRUs and this seems to
have resulted in the larger ﬁrms backing oﬀ on investment.
This second point is somewhat paradoxical when we consider that IRUs are not too sunk, and
therefore are not the best way to carry out a building ahead strategy. Probably the most plausible
interpretation is that IRUs served as a sort of “placeholder” or even a form of (fairly) cheap talk to
coordinate which ﬁrms would build national networks. Once the market was ﬁlled up by ﬁrms using
IRUs, the incumbent ﬁrms had less incentive to invest. Building ahead is essentially a speculative
13p-values of 46%, 81%, 37% and 4% respectively.
14p-values of 0.3%, 0.6%, 1.1%, and 25.9% respectively.
16strategy, and it appears that IRUs’ lower cost trumped their lower commitment value for ﬁrms
following that strategy.
6 Conclusion
We have examined the number of ﬁber-optic route miles built by U.S. telecom ﬁrms from 1990-2001.
By sorting through each ﬁrm’s SEC reports and press releases, we have been able to discover which
routes are based on sunk investments in right of way and conduit and which are based on relatively
non-sunk investment in IRUs. We ﬁnd that more than half of total route miles added during this
period were based on non-sunk forms of investment. We conclude that the loss-producing level of
competition that has prevailed since 2001 is due more to the willingness of ﬁrms to sell IRUs than
to actual over-investment like that which occurred in the nineteenth century railroad boom.
We calculated a Revenue per Mile Index based on industry-wide changes in revenue per route mile
from a 1990 base. This measure suggests that there were opportunities for increased investment in
route miles in the mid 1990s, but that investment after that proceeded much faster than revenue
growth. Using Gilbert and Lieberman’s (1987) model of oligopoly investment, we ﬁnd some evidence
of ﬁrms building ahead of others with regard to total miles; this could lead to excessive entry from an
ex post perspective. Applying the same analysis to owned miles produces less evidence of building
ahead.
Our general conclusion is that the only “excessive” element of national ﬁber optic network invest-
ment was the very extensive sharing of route miles using IRUs. Some of this sharing may have
involved strategic behavior, and it led to remarkably low concentration for an industry with such
high ﬁxed, sunk costs. Not including this sharing, the underlying investment in owned route miles
was more moderate, led to fairly reasonable concentration, and does not appear to have involved
speculative strategies.
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19Figures and Tables
360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 1,181 7,971 11,976 14,176
AT&T 32,398 32,500 33,500 35,000 36,022 37,419 38,704 38,704 39,576 39,576 42,551 46,500
Broadwing (IXC) 914 914 914 1,257 1,357 1,365 2,025 5,500 9,300 15,700 18,500 18,500
DTI 927 1,500 7,250 14,360 17,835
Dynegy 16,000
ENRON 3,400 16,281 16,281 16,281
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 3,801 11,500 1,244
Genuity (GTE) 5,283 12,000 17,500 17,500 20,800
Global Crossing (Frontier) 4,932 9,620 13,000 20,000 20,000
Level 3 410 9,084 15,236 15,639
MCI 16,000 16,700 17,040 19,793 21,460 21,049 23,096 25,234
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 332 332 332 332 519 519 621 866 5,052 8,036 16,600 26,000
Metromedia 3,099 18,000 18,000 18,000
Pathnet 478 1,500
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 1,210 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,408 1,408 3,977 7,101 15,000 25,500 25,500 23,700
Sprint (limited data) 22,093 22,725 22,799 22,996 22,996 22,996 23,432 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574
Touch America (Montana Power) 2,770 9,770 10,466 17,370 21,370
Velocita (PF.net) 4,000
Williams 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 0 0 0 9,300 17,000 20,800 28,700
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 1,300 11,000 12,589 19,619 47,529 47,806 47,806 47,806
XO (NEXTLINK) 16,000 16,000
Total 82,647 84,277 85,691 90,484 94,762 95,756 104,444 134,510 190,311 281,023 355,054 396,125
% change 2.0% 1.7% 5.6% 4.7% 1.0% 9.1% 28.8% 41.5% 47.7% 26.3% 11.6%
1998 1999 2000 2001 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997
Table 1: Total Route Miles, 1990-2001
360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 1,181 3,709 5,309 6,764
AT&T 32,398 32,500 33,500 35,000 36,022 37,419 38,704 38,704 39,576 39,576 41,064 44,009
Broadwing (IXC) 914 914 914 1,257 1,357 1,365 2,025 4,647 6,028 11,186 12,666 12,666
DTI 927 1,500 1,900 4,650 4,900
Dynegy 0
ENRON 1,740 1,740 1,740 1,740
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 790 894 1,244
Genuity (GTE) 0 0 2,753 2,753 6,053
Global Crossing (Frontier) 0 0 0 0 0
Level 3 410 9,022 15,174 15,577
MCI 16,000 16,700 17,040 16,793 18,207 17,858 19,595 25,234
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 332 332 332 332 519 519 621 866 5,052 8,036 9,475 9,740
Metromedia 0 255 255 255
Pathnet 239 980
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 1,210 1,406 1,406 1,406 1,408 1,408 3,977 7,101 14,467 16,322 16,322 14,522
Sprint (limited data) 22,093 22,725 22,799 22,996 22,996 22,996 23,432 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574 23,574
Touch America (Montana Power) 137 3,263 3,308 7,820 8,147
Velocita (PF.net) 1,462
Williams 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 9,700 0 0 0 1,830 10,101 14,812 17,800
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 1,300 11,000 12,589 13,878 41,788 42,065 42,065 42,065
XO (NEXTLINK) 0 0
Total 82,647 84,277 85,691 87,484 91,509 92,565 100,943 115,068 140,409 174,575 199,551 210,516
% change 2.0% 1.7% 2.1% 4.6% 1.2% 9.1% 14.0% 22.0% 24.3% 14.3% 5.5%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Table 2: Owned Route Miles, 1990-2001
20360 Networks (Worldwide Fiber) 100% 47% 44% 48%
AT&T 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 97% 95%
Broadwing (IXC) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 84% 65% 71% 68% 68%
DTI 100% 100% 26% 32% 27%
Dynegy 0%
ENRON 51% 11% 11% 11%
EPIK (Florida East Coast RR) 21% 8% 100%
Genuity (GTE) 0% 0% 16% 16% 29%
Global Crossing (Frontier) 0% 0% 0% 0% 0%
Level 3 100% 99% 100% 100%
MCI 100% 100% 100% 85% 85% 85% 85% 100%
McLeodUSA (+CapRock) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 57% 37%
Metromedia 0% 1% 1% 1%
Pathnet 50% 65%
Qwest (Southern Pacific RR, +LCI) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 96% 64% 64% 61%
Sprint (limited data) 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 100%
Touch America (Montana Power) 5% 33% 32% 45% 38%
Velocita (PF.net) 37%
Williams 100% 100% 100% 100% 100% 20% 59% 71% 62%
Worldcom/MCIWorldcom (LDDS) 100% 100% 100% 71% 88% 88% 88% 88%
XO (NEXTLINK) 0% 0%
Total 100% 100% 100% 97% 97% 97% 97% 86% 74% 62% 56% 53%
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001












1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Added through sharing
Added and owned by others
Added and owned by AT&T, MCI/Worldcom,
Sprint, Qwest, Level 3, Williams
Figure 1: Yearly Additions to Total Route Miles, 1990-2001
21Equal-Sized Equal-Sized
HHI HHI Firms Firms
Year Total Miles Owned Miles Total Miles Owned Miles
1990 2,767           2,767           3.6               3.6              
1991 2,743           2,743           3.6               3.6              
1992 2,764           2,764           3.6               3.6              
1993 2,740           2,788           3.6               3.6              
1994 2,658           2,696           3.8               3.7              
1995 2,723           2,770           3.7               3.6              
1996 2,529           2,561           4.0               3.9              
1997 1,778           2,233           5.6               4.5              
1998 1,425           2,110           7.0               4.7              
1999 892              1,500           11.2              6.7              
2000 708              1,281           14.1              7.8              
2001 674              1,234           14.8              8.1              
Table 4: HHIs and Equivalent Number of Firms, 1990-2001
Year REV GROW RMIT RMIO
1990 155.8 -2.4% 1.00 1.00
1991 155.1 -0.5% 0.98 0.98
1992 159.8 3.0% 0.99 0.99
1993 163.2 2.1% 0.96 0.99
1994 170.1 4.3% 0.95 0.99
1995 175.0 2.9% 0.97 1.00
1996 205.8 17.6% 1.05 1.08
1997 220.0 6.9% 0.87 1.01
1998 229.9 4.5% 0.64 0.87
1999 246.8 7.3% 0.47 0.75
2000 259.3 5.1% 0.39 0.69
2001 261.2 0.7% 0.35 0.66
Table 5: Revenue and Revenue per Mile Index, 1990-2001
(Revenue in billions of 1995 dollars)





Table 6: Percent Change in Total and Owned Miles
(Not including ﬁrst year for new entrants)
22Variable (BA/SI) d = 2.0% d = 7.3% d = 18.6% d = 48.9%
SHARE
T
t−1 -19.5 -2.7 -38.1 -81.1**
0.16 0.86 0.34 0.05
RMI
T
t−1 (+/0) -0.4 1.5 -0.5 -2.8





t−1 24.4* -0.4 42.2 81.9**
0.07 0.98 0.25 0.04
GROWt−1 18.3 25.1* 33.8** 7.5
0.15 0.10 0.05 0.31
GROWt−1 × SHARE
T
t−1 -98.6 -40.3 -157.4 -51.5
0.13 0.63 0.22 0.60
DELSHARE
T
t−1 (0/−) 0.0 -0.1 0.2 0.2





t−1 1.1 2.3 -6.9 -2.8
0.72 0.44 0.56 0.66
BAND
T
t (−/+) 4.0** 5.0** 5.2** 5.0**





t−1 -14.0 -46.3** -22.7 -10.4
0.21 0.05 0.57 0.78
constant -0.5 -2.2 -1.0 1.4
0.70 0.16 0.67 0.48
N 101 101 101 101
Log Likelihood -51.3 -45.6 -32.2 -31.5
Table 7: Probit Analysis of Expansion in Total Miles
(BA/SI) = predicted signs, Building Ahead/Simultaneous Investment hypotheses
p-values below estimates.
** Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
* Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
23Variable (BA/SI) d = 0.7% d = 3.3% d = 9.2% d = 24.7%
SHARE
O
t−1 17.1 22.2 14.4 44.1
0.26 0.16 0.42 0.11
RMI
O
t−1 (+/0) 2.1 3.2 4.0* 7.3**





t−1 2.3 -14.6 -31.4* -50.7*
0.87 0.32 0.09 0.08
GROWt−1 18.4 16.5 22.2 36.1**
0.14 0.20 0.12 0.03
GROWt−1 × SHARE
O
t−1 -91.0 -36.5 -15.0 -133.4
0.14 0.56 0.86 0.26
DELSHARE
O
t−1 (0/−) 3.3** 2.2** -0.5** -0.1





t−1 -12.4* -5.0 14.8** 2.3
0.06 0.47 0.05 0.25
BAND
O
t (−/+) 6.3** 7.8** 8.8** 9.8**





t−1 -31.8** -54.0** -96.8** -76.6
0.04 0.01 0.01 0.16
constant -6.4** -6.3** -4.3** -8.6**
0.01 0.01 0.05 0.00
N 97 97 97 97
Log Likelihood -44.8 -44.2 -38.8 -31.2
Table 8: Probit Analysis of Expansion in Owned Miles
(BA/SI) = predicted signs, Building Ahead/Simultaneous Investment hypotheses
p-values below estimates.
** Signiﬁcant at 0.05 level.
* Signiﬁcant at 0.10 level.
24